Handlebars' triple-brace interpolation fails to protect against structural role injection, as HTML escaping only neutralizes angle-bracket delimiters. It leaves colon and Markdown hash delimiters intact, enabling attackers to hijack model behavior. The default escaping provides no protection for most role delimiter schemes and cannot replace a clear separation of instructions and data.
Handlebars Triple-Brace Injection Exploits Structural Role Delimiters
Handlebars Triple-Brace Injection Exploits Structural Role Delimiters
Handlebars' triple-brace interpolation fails to protect against structural role injection, as HTML escaping only neutralizes angle-bracket delimiters. It leaves colon and Markdown hash delimiters intact, enabling attackers to hijack model turns. The default escaping provides no protection for most role delimiter families and cannot replace a structural separation of instructions and data.
Handlebars Triple-Brace Injection Exploits Structural Role Delimiters
Handlebars' triple-brace interpolation fails to protect against structural role injection, as HTML escaping only neutralizes angle-bracket delimiters. It leaves colon and Markdown hash delimiters intact, enabling attackers to hijack model turns. The default escaping provides no protection for most delimiter families and cannot replace a structural separation of instruction and data.
NRT-Bench: Multi-turn Red-teaming of LLM Agents in Safety-Critical Systems
NRT-Bench introduces a benchmark for multi-turn red-teaming of LLM agents operating in a simulated nuclear power plant. Across four frontier operator models, 8.7% to 12.1% of attack sessions result in loss of a critical safety function, with vulnerabilities largely disjoint across models. The effectiveness of defences varies significantly by model, showing strong model dependence.
Defensive Misdirection Against Automated Attacks on Agentic AI
Agentic AI systems face growing threats from model-guided automated attacks. A new defense strategy, Contextual Misdirection via Progressive Engagement (CMPE), reduces attacker success rates by up to two orders of magnitude and nearly eliminates verified attack success in benchmark tests.
Over-Privileged Tool Selection in LLM Agents
LLM agents commonly select higher-privilege tools despite sufficient lower-privilege alternatives. This over-privileged behavior is amplified by transient tool failures and does not reliably improve with general safety alignment. A new privilege-aware post-training defense reduces unnecessary high-privilege tool use while maintaining agent capabilities.